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Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical and methodological account of an important con-
troversy between neoclassical resources economics and ecological economics, from
the early 1970s to the end of the 1990s. It shows that the assumption of unbounded
resources productivity in the work of Solow and Stiglitz, and the related concepts
of substitution and technical progress, rest on a model-based methodology. On the
other hand, Georgescu-Roegen’s assumption of thermodynamic limits to production,
later revived by Daly, comes from a methodology of interdisciplinary consistency. I
conclude that neither side provided a definitive proof of its own claim because both
face important conceptual issues.
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1. Introduction
Modern economic thought on natural resources issues has gone through an important
episode in the 1970s1. One of the event that triggered this was the publication of the
report The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972), which suggested that continued
economic growth could lead to ecological collapse, due to resource depletion and the
accumulation of pollution. Growth economists, such as Robert Solow (1973, 1974a,b)
and Joseph Stiglitz (1974), strongly criticised the report, both on methodological and
theoretical ground. In parallel, they proposed their own approach, based on the neoclas-
sical growth framework initiated by Solow (1956) and that had become very popular in
the 1960s (Boianovsky and Hoover 2009). Among important assumptions, their models
CONTACT Quentin Couix. Email: quentin.couix@univ-paris1.fr. This paper has been accepted for publica-
tion in The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought. This is a preprint unrefereed version.
1The preoccupations regarding the depletion of natural resources had been discussed in economics before this
period. See for instance Missemer (2017) for an account of the transformations of the analysis of fossil fuels
exhaustion from Stanley Jevons’s The Coal Question in 1865 to “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources” by
Harold Hotelling in 1931. Even though they partially relied on these earlier works, the paradigms that emerged
in the 1970s rested on new concepts and tools that considerably reframed the way questions were set.
incorporated the idea that the productivity of resources could be increased indefinitely
thanks to the substitution of capital to resources or technical progress. This led to the
conclusion that constant or even growing consumption could be achieved in the long
run, and these contributions laid the foundations of a new branch of growth theory,
here labelled as “neoclassical resources economics”.
But almost at the same time, a paradigm had emerged inside the economic community
which was closer to the views of the Club of Rome. It was initiated in particular by
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971), who became more and more critical of neoclassical
theory after contributing to it2. He proposed a reorientation of economic theory based
on references to thermodynamics, and placing environmental issues at the heart of its
preoccupations. This naturally led him to take part in the debate on the limits to growth
(Levallois 2010), criticising Solow’s and Stiglitz’s works on exhaustible resources (1975;
1979), and especially the relevance of their representation of production with unbounded
resources productivity. Conversely, he argued that thermodynamic laws set limits to
substitutability and technical progress.
This criticism was revived by Herman Daly almost twenty years later in an article
called “Georgescu-Roegen versus Solow/Stiglitz” (1997a). As a former student, Daly
had been much influenced by Georgescu-Roegen. He played an important role in the
institutionalisation of the new school of “ecological economics”, where he promoted
the ideas of his mentor. In fact, his article of 1997 was part of an issue of Ecological
Economics dedicated to Georgescu-Roegen, who had died in 1994. It generated one of
the rare direct confrontations between neoclassical resources economists and ecological
economists, which shows how much the underlying issues are constitutive of this opposi-
tion. Hence, studying this controversy, from the 1970s to the 1990s is a good opportunity
to better understand the fundamental divergences between these two paradigms. The
purpose of the present paper is to give a detailed account of it, with a focus on the
theoretical and methodological issues at stake3.
The article is organised in three sections. Section 2 shows how the assumption of
unbounded resources productivity was integrated in Solow’s and Stiglitz’s models un-
der the form of capital substitution or exogenous technical progress. I characterise the
methodology underpinning this approach as model-based, and I examine the concep-
tual issues it raises. Section 3 introduces Georgescu-Roegen’s thermodynamic approach
of the economic process. I reconstruct and critically examine his criticism of Solow’s
and Stiglitz’s works, focusing on the idea of thermodynamic limits and its underlying
methodology of interdisciplinary consistency. Finally, section 4 shows that the debate
of 1997 rests on the same theoretical and methodological oppositions, and highlights
in particular the issues related to the conceptual integration of physical and economic
concepts.
2. Solow, Stiglitz, and the Origins of Neoclassical Resources Economics
As Robert Solow expressed it in his Richard T. Ely lecture in December 1973, it is the
report The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) that sparked his interest for natural
2Kenneth Boulding (1966) is another important early contributor of this new paradigm and he shares a similar
intellectual trajectory.
3By “theory”, I mean the concepts that constitute the intellectual framework through which economists
conceive their objects of study. In particular, I distinguish them from “models” as purely mathematical systems.
Moreover, while in general “methodology” denotes the global articulation between the different constituents of
a paradigm, here it is primarily understood as the way concepts are built.
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resources:
About a year ago, having seen several of those respectable committee reports on the
advancing scarcity of materials in the United States and the world, and having, like
everyone else, been suckered into reading The Limits to Growth, I decided I ought to find
out what economic theory has to say about the problems connected with exhaustible
resources. (Solow 1974a, 1-2)
His model was presented in a “Symposium on the Economics of Exhaustible Re-
sources”, and later published in a special issue of The Review of Economic Studies
(1974b). Together with that of Stiglitz (1974) in the same issue, his article had an
important influence on later works. These papers shared a similar framework and laid
the foundations of the neoclassical analysis of growth with exhaustible resources, or
“neoclassical resources economics”4.
2.1. Growth Models and Unbounded Resources Productivity
The general framework is that of Solow’s neoclassical growth model (1956). Among the
key features of this model is the notion of “production function”, relating the level of
output Q to the level of the factors of production. While, traditionally, only aggregate
capital K and labour L were considered as relevant production factors, neoclassical
resources economists introduced a variable R representing the flow of resources in the
production function:
Q = F (K,R,L, t) (1)
The notion of “resource” itself is illustrated either by energy sources, such as oil or
coal, or by minerals, such as copper or phosphorous. The important features of these
resources are that they are considered exhaustible and taken from a finite stock S0.
Time t is also involved in the production function to account for “exogenous technical
progress”, defined most generally as variations of output that are not attributable to
variations of the factors of production.
The evolution of capital and population is similar to traditional growth theory, since
net investment is equal to total production minus consumption, and population grows
at an exogenous rate. Given this framework, the question addressed by both Solow
and Stiglitz is to know whether certain intergenerational levels of consumption can be
achieved or not, but they consider slightly different configurations of this problem.
Solow (1974b) studies the case of a constant population and a constant consumption
per head across generations, which he links to the notion of justice in the work of John
Rawls5. Then, he argues that some assumptions have to be made on the production
function for the problem not to be trivial:
For the problem to be interesting and substantial, R must enter in a certain way. For
example, if production is possible without natural resources, then they introduce no new
element. [...] On the other hand, if the average product of resources is bounded, then
4Still in the same issue, Dasgupta and Heal (1974) provided another important contribution, which leads some
authors to speak of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (DHSS) model. I do not consider the work of Dasgupta and
Heal in the present paper for two reasons: first, they did not participate actively in the subsequent controversy
with ecological economists; second, their model relies on a utilitarian norm of intergenerational distribution
that would require to introduce additional formal aspects but would not contribute to better understanding
the controversy.
5See Erreygers (2009) for a discussion of this aspect.
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only a finite amount of output can ever be produced from the finite pool of resources;
and the only level of aggregate consumption maintainable for infinite time is zero.
The interesting case is one in which R = 0 entails Q = 0, but the average product of
R has no upper bound. (Solow 1974b, 34)
Here, Solow introduces the assumption of “unbounded resources productivity” which
postulates that output is not absolutely limited by the flow of resources. As he ac-
knowledges, this assumption is crucial if one looks for levels of consumption that can be
maintained indefinitely, since otherwise consumption must necessarily decline at some
point. Moreover, according to him, this justifies to use a Cobb-Douglas production
function of the form:
Q = KαRβLγ , α + β + γ = 1 (2)
In this case, it is the “substitutability” between aggregate capital and resources that
ensures unbounded resources productivity6. Under these assumptions, Solow demon-
strates that a strictly positive level of consumption can be maintained if and only if the
output elasticity of capital is greater than that of resources7:
α > β (3)
The path that realises this constant consumption per head has monotonically increas-
ing capital stock and decreasing resource flow. Therefore, the possibilities of substitution
inherent to the Cobb-Douglas production function, and the assumption of unbounded
resources productivity it encapsulates, play a central role in this result.
On his side, Stiglitz (1974) examines the case of a population growing at a constant
rate n, with a Cobb-Douglas production function and exogenous technical progress at
a constant rate λ, such that:
Q = eλtKαRβLγ , α + β + γ = 1 (4)
In this framework, he shows that a constant consumption per head can be maintained
6Formally, this can be seen by rewriting the production function as: Q
R
= (K
R
)α(L
R
)γ . Under this form, if
R and L are constant, the productivity of resources on the left may be as big as one wishes, provided K is
sufficiently great.
7Solow’s demonstration relies on the minimisation of
∫∞
0 R(t)dt under the constraint of the equation governing
capital accumulation K˙ = Q−C. This minimisation yields a second equation of evolution involving the marginal
productivities of resources and capital, FR and FK :
F˙R
FR
= FK
Together, these two relations form a differential system whose solutions describe the dynamics of an hypothetical
economy. Solow shows that there exists a path that consumes less than the total stock of resources if and only
if inequality (3) is satisfied.
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if and only if8:
n <
λ
β
(5)
This condition is interpreted as the need for “resource augmenting technical progress”
to be greater than the rate of demographic growth9. Rather than capital substituting
to resources, it is now technical progress that plays the central role in compensating
the decreasing flow of resources. But this is just an other way of ensuring the same
assumption of unbounded resources productivity10.
Hence, unbounded resources productivity, under the form of technical progress or
substitutability, is crucial to overcome the scarcity of resources in these models. As
Stiglitz himself summarises :
The fact that there is a limited amount of natural resources and natural resources are
necessary for production does not necessarily imply that the economy must eventually
stagnate and then decline. Two offsetting forces have been identified: technical change
and capital accumulation. Even with no technical change, capital accumulation can off-
set the effects of the declining inputs of natural resources, so long as capital is ‘more
important’ than natural resources, i.e. the share of capital is greater than that of natural
resources. With technical change, at any positive rate, we can easily find paths along
which aggregate output does not decline. (Stiglitz 1974, 130-131)
2.2. A Model-Based Methodology
The work of Solow and Stiglitz gave to neoclassical resources economics its most impor-
tant features. A whole literature was built on this framework, to which Solow and Stiglitz
made other important contributions11. Along this trend, the assumption of unbounded
resources productivity, and the notions of substitution and technical progress, kept a
central role. I investigate here the foundations of this assumption and the representation
of production it relies on.
For this purpose, it is necessary to understand how substitution and technical
progress, which are used to describe and legitimate this assumption, are conceived
in neoclassical resources economics. In analytical contributions (Solow 1974b; Stiglitz
1974), these notions primarily appear as mathematical properties of production func-
8Stiglitz’s equations of evolution are similar to that obtained by Solow, except that they introduce constant
growth rates of technical progress and population. In fact, Stiglitz establishes a more general condition for
aggregate consumption to grow at a constant rate g:
g <
λ+ γn
1− α
Setting g = n in this inequality yields condition (5).
9Rewriting the production function as Q = Kα(Re
λ
β
t)βLγ we see that λ
β
can be considered as the rate at
which technical progress improves the level of resources, which justifies the label “resource augmenting technical
progress”.
10In the second part of the same paper, Stiglitz studies another model based on a similar framework but using a
utilitarian norm of intergenerational distribution, which consists in maximising the sum of discounted utilities
across generations. Once again, technical progress plays a central role in escaping the scarcity of resources
in this model, since the asymptotic growth rate of consumption per head is positive if and only if resource
augmenting technical progress is greater than the discount rate.
11Stiglitz (1976) concentrated on the implications of competitive markets and alternative institutional struc-
tures on the allocation of resources. Solow and Wan (1976) explored an elaborated version of the growth model
with extraction costs of the resource, and Solow (1978) analysed data on the price and the availability of
resources.
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tions. On the one hand, substitution describes the possibility of increasing the produc-
tivity of resources QR by increasing the level of capital K. On the other hand, technical
progress is concentrated in the multiplier eλt, its determinants are not specified and it
is assumed to be independent of the factors of production. This endows them with well
identified mathematical meanings.
However, these mathematical meanings do not give any conceptual substance to these
notions. In fact, there are very few conceptual elaborations of them in the work of Solow
and Stiglitz, most of which can be found in interpretative essays where these notions
are described in more concrete terms (Solow 1974a; Stiglitz 1979). In this part of the
literature, three different mechanisms can be identified to illustrate the notion of substi-
tutability. First, substitution may occur between resources, for instance from oil to coal
thanks to coal-liquefaction technology (Solow 1974a, 5), or from fossil fuels to “backstop
technologies”, such as nuclear fusion or solar energy (Solow 1974a, 11). Second, substi-
tution can mean a change in the composition of output toward less resource-intensive
goods (Solow 1978, 6). And finally, it can denote a transformation of the production
process toward fuel-saving technologies (Solow 1978, 6).
The problem with these different definitions of substitution is that none of them is
adequately represented by the model. Indeed, the first one is rather substitution between
resources than substitution between capital and resources, but there is no variable in
the model describing an alternative resource that would substitute to the exhaustible
one. The second definition in turn relies on a substitution between produced goods
which cannot be represented explicitly in the model because only an aggregate output
is displayed. And similarly, the third one is rather substitution between different kinds
of capital, whereas only an aggregate capital variable appears in the model. The fun-
damental issue here is that, in all these definitions, the concept of substitution relies
on underlying mechanisms that are not represented explicitly in the model. This cre-
ates an important discrepancy between its conceptual meaning and its mathematical
representation.
Moreover, it also blurs the true significance of the concept and in particular its dis-
tinction with the notion of technical progress. Indeed, the main illustration of technical
progress in the literature is that of “natural-resource-saving technical progress” (Solow
1974a, 10), which seems very close to the third definition of substitution above. This
shows that substitution and technical progress conceptually overlap and cannot be con-
ceived in a strictly separated way, whereas this is what is done at the mathematical
level where they appear as distinct and independent properties. Once again, this re-
veals an inconsistency between the conceptual and the mathematical levels, or between
the theory and the model.
My suggestion is that this issue comes from a “model-based” methodology, by which
I mean that the model precedes the conceptual structure of the theory. In this sense, the
latter does not rely on a self-supporting understanding of the production process, and
concepts are instead primarily forged as descriptions of the properties of the model. It is
only in a second time, and in a very succinct way, that Solow and Stiglitz try to describe
them in more concrete terms, which reveal that these concepts rely on mechanisms that
are not explicitly represented in the model and that they tend to overlap. The underlying
issue is to know how concepts that primarily arise from a model can make sense outside
of the model and give rise to a consistent understanding of production.
In order to characterise more accurately what I mean, it may be useful to contrast
this situation with the analysis of modelling practices in economic philosophy. Among
the epistemic functions of models identified by Morgan (2008), the one that seems most
closely related to the present subject is “modelling as theorising”. In this approach,
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whose first methodological account is attributed to Tjalling Koopmans, models are
considered useful to derive logical implications from a set of initial postulates, whose
combined effect would otherwise not be self-evident. Implicitly, this presupposes that the
conceptual structure of the theory, in which postulates are first formulated, pre-exists
to its formalisation in a model, which is only intended to articulate it more rigorously.
Conversely, in the approach of Solow and Stiglitz, the representation of substitution and
technical progress in production functions is anterior to their proper conceptualisation.
The notion of “representation” provides another interesting way to investigate further
the issues raised by the relations between conceptual and mathematical levels. Among
other conceptions, the “structuralist” approach holds that “the structure specified by
a model represents its target system if it is either structurally isomorphic or somehow
similar to it” (Morgan and Knuuttila 2012, 69). Comparing this position with the way
Solow and Stiglitz deal with substitution and technical progress, we may say that there
is no structural consistency between their conceptual and mathematical accounts of
these notions. In particular, the underlying mechanisms of substitution among resources,
capital equipment or produced goods are not explicit in their models. Instead, the
models represent substitution as a relation between capital and resources, which appears
structurally inconsistent12.
As the assumption of “unbounded resources productivity” is incorporated in the
model either under the form of technical progress or substitution, it inherits these issues.
More precisely, good definitions of these concepts are a necessary condition to make
sense of this assumption, but not a sufficient one. Even if we agree that the mechanisms
encompassed by these concepts allow for the rise of the productivity of resources, this
rise could be limited. Hence, in order to appreciate the potential magnitude of their
effects and assess the relevance of the assumption of unbounded resources productivity,
we need accurate conceptual definitions.
Since the models appear to be the source of the concepts, and not the converse, it is
important to understand the other reasons that determine the choice of the models of
production used in neoclassical resources economics. The most interesting contribution
in this respect is certainly that of Stiglitz (1979), who proposes a reflexive account of
the foundations of neoclassical resources economics.
The first set of justifications of this approach relies on the empirical relevance of the
production functions they use. On this point, Solow and Stiglitz generally refer to the
estimates performed by Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) on constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production functions. These suggest elasticities greater than one and interpret
it as a demonstration of the important possibilities of substitution between capital and
resources13. However, Stiglitz acknowledges that “the crucial question is what is to be
taken as a constant” and he concedes that “resource pessimists” could oppose that
12Of course, this is only a problem if the theory aims at representing the world, or at least a certain conceptual
picture of the world. Following Mäki (2012), we may characterise this prerequisite as “minimally realist”. If
instead a purely “instrumentalist” approach constituted the underlying methodology, this structural inconsis-
tency would not as important. But, precisely, because Solow and Stiglitz attempt in a few places to make sense
of substitution and technical progress as descriptive concepts of the actual world, we may assume that this is
not their position. Instead, they seem to think that their representation of production can be considered as a
sufficiently good one according to some commonsense experience of the world. Hence, the issue of structural
consistency seems relevant in this conception of economics as a “science of commonsensibles” (Mäki 2012).
13The elasticity of substitution between factors x and y of a production function F (x, y) is defined as σ =
d ln y/x
d lnFx/Fy . CES production functions are of the form:
Q = F (K,R,L) = [αK
σ−1
σ + βR
σ−1
σ + γL
σ−1
σ ]
σ
σ−1
The Cobb-Douglas is a special case of this family of functions, when the elasticity of substitution is unitary:
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“the particular parameterization implicit in the above calculation that the elasticity of
substitution is constant is not correct: for example, they might argue that as resources
become scarcer, the elasticity declines” (44-45). To solve this problem, Stiglitz suggests
to allow the elasticity to vary and test the assumption that it is constant. However, one
might equally contest that, because the elasticity is constant according to past data, it
will be constant under every condition of production, and in particular with a decreasing
flow of resources. Hence, empirical estimates cannot provide satisfactory justifications
of production functions, at least for long term purposes, and instead must ultimately
rely on theoretical justifications.
This leads to another set of justifications which imply mathematical concerns. It is
illustrated by Solow’s claim to have an “interesting and substantial” problem whose
solutions are not trivial and offer some ground for mathematical investigations (1974b,
34). This approach is also endorsed by Stiglitz (1979, 44) when he insists on the distinc-
tion between “analytical methods” and “simulations”. The former looks for the condi-
tions which determine different answers to the problem, as when neoclassical resources
economists set forth conditions (3) and (5). The latter instead gives numerical solutions
for different “scenarios” characterised by some values of the parameters, as done in the
report on The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972). Stiglitz defends the superior-
ity of analytical methods because they enable to identify the exact frontier separating
different behaviours of the model, while simulations only answer the problem for spe-
cific values of the parameters. However, analytical methods can only apply to relatively
simple models. The analytical resolution or the qualitative analysis of differential sys-
tems is generally out of reach if the model is too complex. Good illustrations of this
are Solow’s repeated justifications that the Cobb-Douglas “[simplifies] the treatment
of technical progress” (1974b, 34) or that “a complete analysis of [the implications of
unlimited technical progress] would be laborious” (40). Along this line, the choice of the
Cobb-Douglas production function is implicitly linked to the simplistic representation
of production it provides14.
Finally, another implicit, but obvious, motivation for choosing theses kinds of pro-
duction functions is the continuity with the tools used in traditional neoclassical growth
theory, which had become dominant in the 1960s (Boianovsky and Hoover 2009). How-
ever, it denotes at the same time the absence of a reflection on the specificity of natural
resources as a factor of production. The symmetric character of the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function puts capital, labour and resources on the same level. This also implies
the transposition from the traditional theory of the concepts of “substitution” or “tech-
nical progress”, without adapting it to the specificity of natural resources. Hence, no
consideration on the nature of the production process and on the interrelation of re-
sources and other factors appears as the root of this choice.
Altogether, this shows that in the “model-based” methodology of Solow and Stiglitz
the preference for a specific production function among the infinitely many mathemati-
cal forms available is not grounded into an appreciation of the nature of the production
process, and instead is determined by modelling practices and mathematical concerns.
σ = 1. When σ > 1, R = 0 does not imply Q = 0, that is to say that resources are not essential to production.
In these conditions it is obviously possible to maintain a constant level of consumption across generations.
Conversely, if 0 < σ < 1, then resources are essential, but the productivity of resources is bounded and no
constant level of consumption can be maintained indefinitely.
14Halsmayer (2014) shows that the simplicity of Solow’s growth model was acknowledged by himself and
conceived as an alternative to complex models, such as Leontief’s input-output tables or Keynesian macro-
econometric models. In this context, it was justified, on the one hand, as a “prototype” on which more refined
models should be built, and, on the other hand, as a pedagogical tool in which elementary economic mechanisms
could be explained transparently.
8
In this framework, the assumption of unbounded resources productivity should primar-
ily be understood as a mathematical requirement without conceptual substance. The
notions of technical progress and substitution used to support it are themselves first
introduced as mathematical properties of production functions for which a conceptual
elaboration consistent with their representation in the model is missing.
This is all the more important because Stiglitz himself sets the problem at a concep-
tual level when he challenges “resource pessimists” to show that “as resources become
scarcer we do not, or cannot, substitute less resource-intensive commodities for more
resource-intensive commodities” and that “the prospects are bleak for technical changes
that would enable us better to use what resources we have” (1979, 47). Since he ex-
plicitly includes Georgescu-Roegen among those “resource pessimists”, it is no surprise
that the latter took up the challenge. The next section examines his own approach and
his criticism of neoclassical resources economics.
3. Georgescu-Roegen and Thermodynamic Limits to Production
After dedicating his early academic career to analytical issues in neoclassical theo-
ries of consumption and production, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen became increasingly
disatisfied with this framework during the 1960s15, which culminated with his book
The Entropy Law and The Economic Process (1971). As this title suggests, Georgescu-
Roegen advocates, among other things, to account for thermodynamic laws in economic
theory16, and it is on this basis that he later criticised neoclassical resources economics.
3.1. Thermodynamics and the Economic Process
Thermodynamics can be broadly defined as the science of the transformations of energy,
and rests on two main principles17. The first principle states the “energy” of an isolated
system can change its form but its quantity is conserved. Georgescu-Roegen (1971, 5)
illustrates this principle with the functioning of a “railway engine”, where the chemical
energy of coal is first transformed in thermal energy (heat) at high temperature and
then in mechanical energy (movement) plus thermal energy at low temperature, but the
total amount of energy is constant across the process.
The second principle of thermodynamics specifies what are the possible transforma-
tions between the different forms of energy. It stems from the work on thermal engines of
Sadi Carnot in 1824, later reformulated in the formalism of energy by Rudolf Clausius.
Carnot’s main achievement was to prove that the efficiency of a thermal engine, such
as the one used in the railway example above, has a theoretical maximum. This result
means that a given amount of thermal energy cannot be fully transformed into mechani-
cal energy18, whereas the opposite is possible by friction. This is why Georgescu-Roegen
15The transition is well illustrated by his book Analytical Economics (1966), which contains both his most
important contributions to neoclassical theory, and an introduction to his new research program. However,
historical accounts of the evolution of Georgescu-Roegen’s thought underline that he has had a critical look on
the foundations of neoclassical theory since the beginning of his career (Gowdy and Mesner 1998). Moreover, this
trajectory is best understood under the light of the influence that Joseph Schumpeter had on him (Bobulescu
2012).
16This idea had had precursors before Georgescu-Roegen, such as Sergeï Podolinsky and Frederick Soddy,
but they are less well known and himself seemed not to be aware of them when he first suggested it. See
Martinez-Alier (1987) for an account of these antecedents.
17Thermodynamics has two other principles which are not of interest for us here. See for instance Poirier (2014)
for a conceptual introduction to thermodynamics.
18More precisely, if the source of the heat flow Q1 is at temperature T1, if it is in an environment at temperature
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distinguishes “available energy” that can be transformed into mechanical work from “la-
tent energy” that cannot. According to this distinction, Carnot’s principle implies that
“[available] energy always dissipates by itself (and without any loss) into latent energy”,
which is considered as a “qualitative degradation of energy” (1971, 129). For instance,
when mechanical work is transformed into heat at atmospheric temperature, it is lost
forever and cannot be recovered.
This statement can be reformulated using the concept of “entropy”, which achieves an
“analytical simplification and unification”. However, Georgescu-Roegen never formally
defines entropy, which he considers to be unnecessarily technical, and prefers the literal
definition as “an index of the relative amount of [latent] energy in an isolated structure”
(1971, 5)19. This is why the second principle of thermodynamics is also known as the
entropy law, which states that the entropy of an isolated system increases toward a
maximum.
These two laws are primarily concerned with the properties of energy. However,
Georgescu-Roegen considers that they are also relevant for matter. Regarding the first
law, this simply leads him to interpret it more broadly as the conservation of energy and
matter, separately (1971, 5). But he also suggests that matter is subject to a qualitative
degradation equivalent to that of energy20. Hence, according to him, conservation and
degradation are characteristics of both energy and matter.
These laws are central in Georgescu-Roegen’s understanding of the economic process,
which he describes as “a continuous transformation of low entropy into high entropy,
that is, into irrevocable waste” (1971, 281, italics in the original). As a consequence,
the entropy law is considered as the physical principal underpinning the depletion of
natural resources. For Georgescu-Roegen, this is true for energy resources, such as coal
or solar energy, but also for minerals, such as copper. This leads him to underline the
radical scarcity that governs these resources because, “first, the amount of low entropy
within our environment (at least) decreases continuously and irrevocably, and second,
a given amount of low entropy can be used by us only once” (1971, 278, italics in the
original).
With this perspective, Georgescu-Roegen has been an important contributor of the
renewed interest for natural resources issues in economics in the 1970s. However, The
Entropy Law and the Economic Process didn’t reach a large audience and he had to
wait the debate on the limits to growth to find a more favourable context.
3.2. Georgescu-Roegen’s Criticism of Neoclassical Resources Economics
When the debate started, Georgescu-Roegen offered his help to answer the criticisms
addressed by economists to the report (Levallois 2010). This led to his paper “Energy
and Economic Myths” (1975) and was an opportunity to promote his own paradigm.
In this paper, after recalling his thermodynamic approach of the economic process,
Georgescu-Roegen suggests to distinguish between “available” and “accessible” energy.
T0 < T1, and if W is the amount of work produced, then the efficiency of the engine η = WQ1 is bounded by
Carnot’s coefficient:
ηm =
T1 − T0
T1
< 1
19See for example Poirier (2014) for a more complete introduction to this concept.
20On this topic, Georgescu-Roegen went from believing that the dissipation of matter is a direct consequence
of the entropy law, to the idea that it has been ignored by thermodynamics and deserves the status of a
fourth law. This has become one of his most controversial claim and it has raised many comments in ecological
economics. See for instance Cleveland and Ruth (1997), or Ayres (1999).
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He notes that extracting available energy from its deposit, for example in oil wells, and
making it properly useful, implies to spend some energy to extract, transport or refine
the resource. If the energy spent in this process is less than the energy obtained then the
resource is said to be accessible, otherwise, the deposit is not energetically profitable.
In this context, he calls “efficiency” the ratio of the energy extracted over the energy
spent21, and he writes:
To be sure, actual efficiency depends at any one time on the state of the arts. But, as
we know from Carnot, in each particular situation there is a theoretical limit independent
of the state of the arts, which can never be attained in actuality. In effect, we generally
remain far below it. (Georgescu-Roegen 1975, 355)
This statement is the first occurrence of the idea of thermodynamic limits in
Georgescu-Roegen’s work. It clearly refers to Carnot’s maximum efficiency of ther-
mal engines, which is presented as the typical kind of limits that thermodynamics
may impose on production processes, and in particular here on energy extraction. But
Georgescu-Roegen goes further and suggests that Carnot’s coefficient implies thermo-
dynamic limits to technical progress in general:
Even if technology continues to progress, it will not necessarily exceed any limit; an
increasing sequence may have an upper limit. In the case of technology this limit is set
by the theoretical coefficient of efficiency. (Georgescu-Roegen 1975, 362)
This proposition can be interpreted as the idea that the production of any economic
good or service requires a theoretical minimum consumption of energy. At that time,
this idea is presented as a general counter-argument to the technological optimism of the
economists that criticise the report The Limits to Growth. Georgescu-Roegen notices
in particular that “in Solow’s hands, substitution becomes the key factor that supports
technological progress even as resources become increasingly scarce” (1975, 362). But
the analytical framework of neoclassical resources economics and the assumption of
“unbounded resources productivity” are not discussed in details.
The relation becomes more direct in 1979, when Georgescu-Roegen formulates a
criticism of the work of Solow and Stiglitz, and especially of the analytical representation
of production on which it rests22. Focusing on the assumption of unbounded resources
productivity incorporated in the Cobb-Douglas production function, he puts forward
different arguments against it, which I critically examine here.
First, Georgescu-Roegen underlines that “the increase of capital implies an additional
depletion of resources” and suggests that if capital increases toward infinity, then “[re-
sources] will rapidly be exhausted by the production of capital” (1979, 97). However,
Solow’s and Stiglitz’s works are consistent with the premise that the production of cap-
ital depletes resources. In their models, the increment of capital at every time is taken
on the aggregate product, itself produced thanks to resources. This does not prevent
capital from increasing to infinity in Solow’s model, precisely because the productivity
of resources increases faster and enables the flow of resources to decrease toward zero.
Hence, this model is consistent from the mathematical point of view, and Georgescu-
Roegen’s first argument by itself is not sufficient.
21Nowadays, in energy analysis, this ratio is also known as the energy return on energy invested (EROI) and
used as an indicator of the accessibility of energy sources.
22Georgescu-Roegen’s criticism concerns other aspects of neoclassical resources economics as well. For instance,
he denies that the appropriate intergenerational distribution may be achieved by market processes alone or
questions the relevance of empirical estimates of production functions. However, these topics have not been
tackled in the 1997 debate, and therefore are less interesting to understand the opposition between ecological
economists and neoclassical resources economists.
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This leads to the second argument, according to which “any material process consists
in the transformation of some materials into others (the flow elements) by some agents
(the fund elements)”. The distinction between flows and funds in this statement sug-
gests a difference of nature between the different factors of production23. While natural
resources are transformed in the process of production, capital and labour are agents of
this transformation. In this framework, the notion of substitution appears misleading in
the sense that capital cannot play the same role as resources in production. According
to Georgescu-Roegen, “a change in capital or labor can only diminish the amount of
waste in the production of a commodity” (1979, 97). However, this truly represents a
limit only for material requirements, and if it is assumed that goods remain qualitatively
identical.
In order to generalise his argument beyond this restricted case, Georgescu-Roegen
rests once again on the idea of a limit to the productivity of resources:
In some cases it may also be that the same service can be provided by a design that
requires less matter or energy. But even in this direction there exists a limit, unless we
believe that the ultimate fate of the economic process is an earthly Garden of Eden.
(Georgescu-Roegen 1979, 97-98, I emphasise)
This idea appears to be the true logical foundation of Georgescu-Roegen’s criticism.
Without it, the assertion that the increase of capital to infinity implies the exhaus-
tion of resources is not justified. However, compared to the initial statement in 1975,
which focused on energy, this time Georgescu-Roegen suggests that this kind of limit
applies to both energy and matter. Once again, the underlying idea is that the laws of
thermodynamics set constraints on the use of natural resources24.
3.3. Interdisciplinary Consistency
From the various contributions of Georgescu-Roegen examined above, there emerges
an assumption of thermodynamic limits to the productivity of resources. It appears
as the logical foundation of his criticism of the assumption of unbounded resources
productivity and his most consistent theoretical answer to the challenge addressed by
Stiglitz to “resource pessimists” (1979, 47). In order to better understand the nature
of this opposition, it is worth examining the methodological foundations underpinning
this assumption.
Missemer (2013, 19) has already insisted on the idea that the choice of scientific
referents exterior to economics, such as thermodynamics or biology, is one pillar of
Georgescu-Roegen’s methodology. He underlines that the goal is not to bring formal
analogies from one discipline to the other, but to capture some essential properties of
the objects under study thanks to the existing body of knowledge. If we refer to the
taxonomy of disciplinary exchanges established by Klein (2010), this corresponds to the
idea of “theoretical interdisciplinarity”, in the sense that it implies strong interactions
23This distinction is the cornerstone of Georgescu-Roegen’s theory of production, known as the flow-fund model
and formulated as a criticism of both neoclassical production functions and Leontief’s input-output tables (1971,
chap. IX). However, apart from the succinct argument above, this alternative model is not mobilised, either by
Georgescu-Roegen or other ecological economists, to formulate more analytically their criticism of neoclassical
resources economics.
24Georgescu-Roegen’s later contributions do not give much more details on these arguments. Here and there,
some allusions to the work of Solow and Stiglitz can be found (Georgescu-Roegen 1981, 1986, 1988), but the
assumption of thermodynamic limits is not even mentioned any more. Moreover, neither Georgescu-Roegen’s
nor Solow’s archives contain correspondence related to these issues.
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between disciplines in order to build new conceptual foundations25.
An important additional aspect of the interaction between thermodynamics and eco-
nomics in Georgescu-Roegen’s approach is that it goes one way: thermodynamics is used
as a source of conceptual inspiration in order to reform the foundations of economics.
The implicit idea behind this kind of interdisciplinarity is that thermodynamics is a ma-
ture and reliable science, whereas economics is an unsatisfying intellectual edifice. The
former in particular is well illustrated by Georgescu-Roegen’s reference to Sir Arthur
Eddington, a physicist and philosopher of science, who considers that the entropy law
occupies “the supreme position among the laws of nature”, and that if a theory is not
consistent with it, “there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation” (Ed-
dington 1928, quoted in Georgescu-Roegen [1982] 2011, 197). This is why I suggest
to speak of “interdisciplinary consistency” to describe Georgescu-Roegen’s methodol-
ogy, because it implies an asymmetrical relationship in which economics is required to
become consistent with the laws of thermodynamics.
Of course these characteristics of Georgescu-Roegen’s methodology make sense only
if we also presuppose an other implicit condition, which is more of an ontological nature:
both disciplines share, at least partially, an interest into the same objects. In the present
case, this requirement is supported by the idea that economics should deal with the
physical facet of economic activities, and more precisely with the role of energy and
matter. If this idea is accepted, then, since thermodynamics is one of the branches of
physics concerned with the transformations of energy and matter, economics should
account for its relevant theoretical consequences.
Therefore, we may summarise the features of Georgescu-Roegen’s methodology as
follows: sameness of object; reliability of the scientific referent; and conceptual integra-
tion. This approach in turn appears quite antithetical with respect to the model-based
methodology of Solow and Stiglitz. It insists on the necessity to understand first the
physical features that characterise the production process, in order to build conceptual
and analytical tools that are consistent with this view. Hence, behind the theoretical
opposition between the assumptions of unbounded resources productivity and thermo-
dynamic limits to production, there is an important methodological opposition.
Moreover, these methodological insights are also useful to point out the issues that
Georgescu-Roegen’s approach faces. Starting with the question of the sameness of ob-
jects, we may notice that Georgescu-Roegen’s focus on the physical aspects of the eco-
nomic process, even though it is not unfamiliar in the history of economic thought,
is considerably original and not easily acceptable for most economists. While classical
economists, such as Ricardo, Malthus and Marx, were interested in the material as-
pects related to agriculture and other natural resources issues (Belloc et al. 2008), the
marginalist revolution has been identified with a trend of “dematerialisation” in eco-
nomic theory (Pottier 2014). The figure of Stanley Jevons is particularly interesting.
While his book The Coal Question warned about the consequences of coal depletion on
the economic supremacy of Great Britain, natural resources were absent of his contri-
bution to the foundations of neoclassical theory. Moreover, even when some neoclassi-
25This taxonomy distinguishes first between “multidisplinarity”, as a mere juxtaposition of analysis on the
same problem from separated disciplines, and “interdisciplinarity”, which implies that some kind of interactions
transform one or more of the disciplines. Then, “theoretical interdisciplinarity” as above is distinguished from
“methodological interdisciplinarity”, involving only the transfer of methods or tools from one discipline to
another.
Moreover, theoretical interdisciplinarity is more explicitly endorsed by recent contributions dealing with the
philosophical foundations of ecological economics (Baumgärtner et al. 2008; Spash 2012), where it appears
tightly linked with the influence of Georgescu-Roegen on this school.
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cal economists were interested in resources, their perspective has been “reductionist”
(Missemer 2017). They analysed them only as a specific isolated market on which to
apply neoclassical tools, not as a fundamental factor of production with potentially
important consequences on growth. In this context, Georgescu-Roegen’s insistence on
the role of energy and matter in the economic process, and as a result the necessity to
account for the laws of thermodynamics in economic theory, appears as a radical di-
vergence with the implicit ontology that dominates economics at the time26. However,
this does not characterise an internal issue inherent to his approach, but rather a strong
disagreement with the rest of the economic community.
Conversely, the way Georgescu-Roegen interprets the laws of thermodynamics reveals
shortcomings that are proper to his perspective. First, in his original mention of the
idea of thermodynamic limits, he relates it to Carnot’s maximum efficiency of thermal
engines. When doing so, he considers the process of extracting energy resources from
their deposit. But this process is very different from that of a thermal engine, where
the mechanical energy produced is a direct transformation of the thermal energy. In
energy production, the resource extracted, oil for instance, is not a transformation of
the energy spent, which is only used to build and run the infrastructures that will
extract the former from a pre-existing deposit. Therefore, Carnot’s principle cannot be
straightforwardly applied in this context, and the proposition would at least need some
more arguments to be convincing.
Second, Georgescu-Roegen’s various presentations of the idea of thermodynamic lim-
its reveal an ambiguity on which entities and which laws should be considered. The first
mention in 1975 focuses on energy and attributes the limits to Carnot’s principle, that
is to the second law of thermodynamics. But in 1979, both matter and energy require-
ments for production are assumed to have a lower limit, and there is no explicit reference
to a particular law of thermodynamics. This shows that thermodynamics, as reliable
a scientific referent as it may be, needs to be interpreted in order to be incorporated
in economics. This in turn needs some accurate analysis of what exactly is relevant for
this purpose, an issue on which Georgescu-Roegen is not sufficiently clear.
Finally, whatever the laws of thermodynamics supporting the idea of limit, the con-
ceptual integration, inherent to Georgescu-Roegen’s methodology of interdisciplinary
consistency, would require a detailed examination of the relations between thermo-
dynamic and economic concepts. This is particularly obvious in 1975, when Carnot’s
maximum efficiency is assumed to set a general limit to “technological progress”. But
it is also perceptible in the statement of 1979, where the limit applies to the “services”
that can be provided by material and energy flows. In both cases, the idea of limit in-
volves a mix of thermodynamic and economic concepts, whose relations have not been
comprehensively investigated. In this context, thermodynamic limits to the productivity
of resources appear rather as an intuition asking for more elaborate developments.
4. The Direct Confrontation between Paradigms
In 1997, an issue of the journal Ecological Economics was dedicated to Georgescu-
Roegen, who had died three years before. On this occasion, Herman Daly revived his
26Of course, Georgescu-Roegen’s paradigm emerges in a rather favourable social context, marked by the rise
of environmental preoccupations, oil shocks that question the dependence of the economy to energy, and
intellectual debates such as the one triggered by the report The Limits to Growth. But as it appears from
Solow’s work for instance, this is not interpreted as the necessity for economists to revise the conceptual
foundations of their theory, but rather to consider these issues from the point of view of their pre-established
theory.
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criticism of neoclassical resources economics with a paper called “Georgescu-Roegen
versus Solow/Stiglitz” (1997a), and focused the debate on the assumption of “ther-
modynamic limits” to production as a counterargument to “unbounded resources pro-
ductivity”. In their replies, Solow and Stiglitz defended the assumption of unbounded
resources productivity (Solow 1997; Stiglitz 1997), while comments from other eco-
logical or neoclassical resources economists varied from some clearly siding with Daly’s
and Georgescu-Roegen’s arguments (Clark; Common; Opschoor; Peet; Tisdell), to some
proposing a more nuanced opinion (Ayres; Pearce; Castle), and others denouncing the
polemical tone and advocating more open-mindedness (Turner; Perrings). This debate
remains one of the few direct confrontations between these two paradigms and shows the
importance of the issues at stake to understand this opposition. As a result, it appears
as a landmark in the related literature, which very often refers to it, but a comprehen-
sive account of the issues raised by the controversy is missing. This is the reason why it
appeared necessary to examine the original works on which the debate is built, in order
to apprehend what remains the same and what changes between the two periods.
Before proceeding with this investigation, it is important to notice that the debate
of 1997 happened in a new intellectual context, that crystallised around the concept
of “sustainability”. Originally defined as “development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”
(Brundtland 1987), the idea of sustainable development had become central for envi-
ronmental issues in the early 1990s. In economics, it became the new battleground of
neoclassical resources economists and ecological economists, which provided two oppos-
ing interpretations of sustainability. On the one hand, “weak sustainability” argued for
the possibility of substituting man-made capital to natural capital as it is depleted.
Solow (1993) was an important and early contributor of this approach, which appears
as an extension of the concept of substitution as developed in growth models with ex-
haustible resources27. On the other hand, ecological economists, especially Daly (1990),
supported the idea of “strong sustainability”, according to which, there are limits to
substitution of man-made capital to natural capital and specific natural life supporting
functions must be preserved. This opposition has framed the debates on environmental
issues until nowadays, each side promoting its own empirical indicators of sustainable
development and policy recommendations (Pezzey and Toman 2005; Neumayer 2013).
Hence, the controversy at stake here offers the opportunity of exploring some of its
foundations.
4.1. Time Horizon of Models and the Laws of Thermodynamics
The first question raised by the debate concerns the relevant interpretation of the time
horizon of models. It is triggered by Stiglitz’s assertion that their models are only
meaningful “for the intermediate run”, that is “for the next 50 – 60 years”, and that
they are written “as if they extend out to infinity, but no one takes these limits seriously”
(1997, 269). This argument is discussed by a number of comments in the debate, which
strongly deny its relevance (Daly; Clark; Opschoor; Tisdell). They consider that this
time horizon is not suitable for ecological purposes, such as resource depletion or climate
change, which have both short and long term consequences. But they also think that
the argument is an ad hoc interpretation put forward to avoid criticisms and that it had
27This use of the concept of substitution is an extension because it concerns natural capital as a whole, which is
broader than natural resources since it includes various other life supporting functions, such as climate stability
or ecosystems.
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never been formulated before.
Even though no one noticed it in the debate, this last opinion is vindicated by the
fact that Solow and Stiglitz have supported quite opposite positions on this topic. In-
deed, Stiglitz notices that “an exponential increase in the population presents almost
unimaginable problems of congestion on our limited planet” (1997, 269), as a justifica-
tion for his medium run interpretation of the time horizon of models. On the other hand,
Solow had asserted that “on a time-scale appropriate to finite resources [...] exponen-
tial growth of population is an inappropriate idealization” (1974b, 36), which implicitly
suggests a long run interpretation. Hence, similarly to what has been identified in the
case of “substitution” and “technical progress” in section 2, this shows that there is no
proper conceptualisation of the role of time in these models. Time is first and for all
a mathematical variable, whose meaning outside of the models is not stabilised. The
multiple interpretations that arise, and vary across time, happen to be in contradiction
with each other and at odd with the basic features of the models.
Reciprocally, the interpretation of the entropy law and the relevant time horizon to
apprehend its consequences are questioned by neoclassical resources economists. For
instance, Solow suggests that it is “of no immediate practical importance for modelling
what is, after all, a brief instant of time in a small corner of the universe” (1997, 268),
an assertion that had already been supported before by Stiglitz (1979, 37). This shows
that both interpret the entropy law only as a long term and global driving force of
the physical world, with no signification for economic activities. This point of view is
criticised by Daly, who underlines the practical consequences of the entropy law, for
instance “that you can’t burn the same lump of coal twice”, or “that there are limits to
the efficiency of conversion of energy” (1997b, 273).
In fact, both aspects are constitutive of the entropy law28. Though it was first stated
through the study of thermal engines by Carnot, a most practical outlook, it has quickly
been interpreted as a general law of evolution of the universe. In an interdisciplinary
perspective, this duality becomes confusing as different authors privilege one interpre-
tation or the other. However, these two interpretations are not contradictory and the
implications of physical laws both at the practical and at the cosmological levels are
common in physics29. Therefore, invoking the long term signification of the entropy
law cannot by itself justify to put aside more immediate consequences for economic
activities.
These immediate consequences are precisely at stake in the confrontation between the
assumptions of “unbounded resources productivity” and “thermodynamic limits”, which
is the central subject of the debate. Relying on Georgescu-Roegen’s 1979 criticism, Daly
presents the issue as follows:
In the Solow-Stiglitz variant [of production function], to make a cake we need not
only the cook and his kitchen, but also some non-zero amount of flour, sugar, eggs, etc.
This seems a great step forward until we realize that we could make our cake a thousand
times bigger with no extra ingredients, if we simply would stir faster and use bigger bowls
and ovens. The conjuring trick is to give the appearance of respecting the first law of
thermodynamics (material balance) without really doing so. (Daly 1997a, 263)
Here, Daly’s interpretation of Georgescu-Roegen has two important implications.
First, it focuses on the first law of thermodynamics rather than the entropy law. Second,
28Even Solow (1974a, 2) wrote once that the laws of thermodynamics constrain possibilities of recycling.
Georgescu-Roegen in turn made statements that supported either the long term cosmological interpretation
(1971, 19, 231) or the practical economical consequences (1971, 6, 278).
29The laws of mechanics, for instance, apply to the movements of planets as well as when one plays basketball.
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it interprets this law as the conservation of mass, and therefore reduces the debate to
the role of matter in production rather than energy. According to this perspective,
thermodynamic limits rest on the fact that the mass of matter that goes out of the
production process, under the form of commodities or waste, is equal to the input of
matter at the entrance of the production process. Hence the mass of input matter is
necessarily greater or equal to the mass of output commodities, and this defines the
minimum requirement of matter.
If we consider the historical account of the idea of thermodynamic limits in Georgescu-
Roegen’s work, as presented in section 3, this interpretation appears as a complete
reversal. Indeed, the original statements in 1975 clearly referred to Carnot’s coefficient
of maximum efficiency, that is rather to the question of energy and the entropy law. Even
in the 1979 paper, which is the main source of Daly, Georgescu-Roegen mentioned both
matter and energy, without precision on the laws involved, so that this interpretation
is at least reductionist. This outcome in turn is partially explained by the fact that
Georgescu-Roegen’s own interpretation of the practical consequences of the laws of
thermodynamics was not sufficiently clear. As a result, most subsequent work that
investigated further the idea of thermodynamic limits to production and tried to put it
on a more analytical level seem to have followed Daly’s interpretation (van den Bergh
1999; Baumgärtner 2004)30. The only author that adopted a more general interpretation
and tried to include both energy and matter conservation, as well as the entropy law,
in a formal model seems to be Krysiak (2006).
4.2. Thermodynamics, Economics, and their Conceptual Integration
However, even this last perspective is not satisfying because it misses another important
aspect of the controversy: the necessity of conceptual integration inherent to Georgescu-
Roegen’s methodology of interdisciplinary consistency. In the debate of 1997, this issue is
raised again in relation with the question of the relevant units for measuring production.
Indeed, Daly’s criticism is based on the idea that “even production functions that yield
services are producing a physical output - the use of something or somebody for some
period of time” (1997a, 264), to which Stiglitz replies that “output is measured not
in physical units, but in the value of the services associated with it” (1997, 269)31.
Moreover, even some ecological economists are sceptical about Daly’s assertion. Ayres for
instance admits that “human welfare is attributable in the final analysis to non-material
services” that have “a material base”, but he denies that “there is some finite upper limit
to the service output of a given material [...] given the possibility of dematerialization,
re-use, renovation, recovery and recycling” (1997, 286)32.
From this point of view, the attempts to incorporate thermodynamic laws in eco-
nomic models and criticise the assumptions of neoclassical resources economics on this
ground (Baumgärtner 2004; Krysiak 2006) tend to hide the issue by simply considering
that produced commodities are measured according to their mass and energy content.
Conservation laws lead to inequalities of the form Q ≤ R, which are interpreted as
30In fact, the integration of mass conservation in a production function in order to question the relevance of
the representation of production in neoclassical resources economics had been suggested before 1997 and goes
back at least to Anderson (1987), who explicitly refers to Georgescu-Roegen’s criticism.
31This question is not mentioned in the early works of Solow and Stiglitz on natural resources. I could only
find an allusion in one of Solow’s original paper on growth theory, where he states that “Q represents output
and K and L represent capital and labor inputs in ‘physical’ units” (1957, 312), which shows at least that the
appropriate units for production is uncertain.
32Following the same line, van den Bergh asserts that “both the service output of materials processing and the
value of this service output do not seem to be bounded by an identifiable absolute limit” (1999, 554).
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incompatible with the assumption of unbounded resources productivity. But of course,
this is not satisfying from an economic point of view as long as mass and energy units
cannot be connected to some economic concepts such as services or values, which are
swept out of the picture by these approaches.
This highlights that the necessity of conceptual integration, previously identified in
Georgescu-Roegen’s methodology of interdisciplinary consistency, still awaits a satis-
fying answer. Even though they do not completely solve this issue, contributions of
ecological economists that care for economic concepts, such as Ayres above, help locat-
ing more accurately where the problem stands. They show that the notion of production
itself has to be refined to be able to assess its dependence to natural resources. More
precisely, the relations between material and energy resources, the goods they enable to
produce, and the non-material services these provide, appear at the heart of the issue. In
addition, the debate highlights that, since the idea of limits presupposes a quantitative
relation, the units according to which concepts are measured matter. While thermody-
namics relies on energy or mass units, production of goods and services have usually
been associated with a value measure in economics, and it is necessary to articulate
both together.
On the other side of the controversy, Solow and Stiglitz are also confronted with the
same issues raised by their “model-based” methodology as they were in the 1970s, and in
particular with that of making sense of “substitution” and “technical progress” outside
of their models. For instance, Solow asserts that “the substitution between renewable
and nonrenewable resources is the essence of the matter” (1997, 267), a question which is
perceived as an important aspect of the debate by some ecological economists too (Clark
1997; Ayres 2007). However, the problem is that this interpretation of substitution is
still not consistent with Solow’s and Stiglitz’s original models, where no such renewable
resources come in to substitute to the exhaustible ones.
Stiglitz in turn suggests that the substitution between capital and resources is about
“more precise machines (made out of resources that are relatively abundant) [that] can
reduce wastage of resources that are relatively scarce”. This shows that there is no
agreement on what is the important feature behind the idea of substitution, and this
interpretation too is hardly consistent with the models, whose aggregate variables do
not enable to represent a change in the nature of capital goods. Moreover, substitution
still overlaps with technical progress, which is defined by Stiglitz as enabling to “reduce
the amounts of physical capital and resources required to produce the unit of output”
(1997, 269). Hence, an overall confusion remains about the meaning of substitution and
technical progress, and their relations with the corresponding properties in the models.
This is underlying Daly’s criticism of the lack of “distinction between substitution
among factors within a given set of technologies (existing state of the art), and sub-
stitution among factors made possible by a new technology (improved state of the
art)” (1997a, 264). This distinction aims at a more direct argument against unbounded
resources productivity. It underlines that if the production function is supposed to rep-
resent actual possibilities of production, then the productivity is bounded because the
set of technologies available at every time is necessarily limited. However, for Daly,
Georgescu-Roegen’s intuition of thermodynamic limits remains a relevant constraint
for future technologies.
Unfortunately, Solow and Stiglitz have not considered this issue in their replies. How-
ever, we can analyse what this distinction would change in the conceptual issues they
face. From this point of view, since technical progress depends on time in their mod-
els, it fits best with the idea of improved state of art. Conversely, substitution between
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capital and resources is independent of time in production functions, and therefore
would correspond to the idea of an existing state of the art. Hence, this could improve
the conceptual distinction between substitution and technical progress. But this would
imply that neoclassical resources economists also accept Daly’s proposition that the
former cannot provide unbounded productivity of resources. Analytically, it means that
at every given time the productivity of resources should be bounded from above, and
therefore that the Cobb-Douglas structure is not satisfying. This would particularly
affect the relevance of Solow’s model. But a time-dependent factor of technical progress
would be admissible, and Stiglitz’s results could potentially be maintained with another
production function because they mainly depend on this factor. However, this would
not solve the whole debate, since the issue of whether technical progress enables to
achieve unbounded resources productivity or is constrained by thermodynamic limits
would remain.
The issues raised by this debate have later been well captured by Mayumi, Giampi-
etro, and Gowdy (1998) and van den Bergh (1999). The latter in particular underlines
that the use of aggregate variables in neoclassical models prevents from accounting more
precisely of the possibilities of substitution. He suggests instead to distinguish direct
substitution, between production factors “having the same function”, from indirect sub-
stitution, between “multiple categories of production factors, which fulfill different, and
often complementary, functions” (549). This distinction is used to provide a classifica-
tion of the different substitutions that may affect the use of energy, materials, capital
and labour in the economic process. It does not tell which are the more relevant a priori,
but instead is presented as a conceptual framework for further empirical investigations
of the issue.
Moreover, van den Bergh adequately acknowledges that focusing only on the physical
dimension of the economic process does not solve the issue more than the conventional
neoclassical approach. He underlines instead that “the interaction between physical and
value dimensions, which is at the heart of the matter, is not really touched upon in ei-
ther approach” (552). While this diagnostic is interesting, the answer he proposes seems
less fruitful. Indeed, Van Den Bergh uses an aggregate model of production very sim-
ilar to those of neoclassical economists, whose main innovation consists in introducing
a “transformation function” between physical and value measures. Hence, the initial
debate between unbounded resources productivity and thermodynamic limits is only
reformulated under the question of whether this function can produce a constant or
growing value with a decreasing physical flow going through the production process.
With this question, most of the conceptual issues regarding the integration of economic
and thermodynamic concepts remain.
5. Conclusion
The analysis above shows that between its two most active periods, in the 1970s and at
the end of 1990s, the controversy between natural resources and ecological economics
rested on the same theoretical and methodological oppositions, even though the more
direct confrontation in the second phase unveils new features. The central theoretical
problem is the conflict between the assumptions of “unbounded resources productivity”
and “thermodynamic limits”, which are associated with two different methodologies
respectively characterised as “model-based” and “interdisciplinary consistency”. Overall,
the conclusion is that neither side has been able to provide a definitive proof of the
validity of its own claim because both face important conceptual issues.
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On the one hand, in Solow’s and Stiglitz’s works, the assumption of unbounded
resources productivity rests on the concepts of “substitution” and “technical progress”.
But these concepts are first associated with mathematical properties of production
functions, because, in the model-based methodology, the model precedes the conceptual
structure of the theory. It is only at a second stage, and in a very succinct way, that
Solow and Stiglitz relate substitution and technical progress to various mechanisms
implying changes in the type of resource, capital or produced goods. But the issue is
that these mechanisms are not explicitly represented in their models, and that, according
to these definitions, substitution and technical progress tend to overlap. This reveals
the difficulty for concepts that primarily arise from a model of making sense outside of
the model. In this respect, the debate of 1997 brought forward the distinction between
actual and improved state of the art, suggested by Daly, which may clarify some aspects
of the question, at the price of forsaking the Cobb-Douglas function. But overall, the
confusion surrounding those concepts lasted over time, leaving uncertain the relevance
of the assumption of unbounded resources productivity.
On the other hand, Georgescu-Roegen’s methodology of “interdisciplinary consis-
tency” is clearly endorsed by Daly and most other ecological economists. They insist on
the necessity to account for thermodynamic constraints on the economic process, but
they do not solve the conceptual issues that this involves. First, this approach presup-
poses a clear interpretation of thermodynamics and of which laws are relevant for this
purpose. Georgescu-Roegen had not been clear about this issue and hinted to various
possible interpretations, involving either matter or energy, and either the first or the
second law of thermodynamics. In this context, Daly’s interpretation that limits are set
by the law of conservation of mass is at least reductionist, if not a complete reversal
regarding Georgescu-Roegen’s original reference to Carnot’s principle, that is to energy
and the second law. A more cautionary approach would be to considers all possible
interpretations and examine their respective relevance. But this assessment in turn re-
quires to consider a second issue, concerned with the conceptual integration between
economic and thermodynamic concepts. While Georgescu-Roegen had left this question
unanswered, the debate of 1997 underlines that the notion of production itself needs to
be questioned, and in particular that the relations between natural resources, produced
goods, and the non-material services they provide, are at the heart of the issue.
All along this controversy, the question of how models may appropriately represent
theoretical concepts appears as a central preoccupation. In particular, the controversy
raises many questions about production functions, some of which go beyond the case of
exhaustible resources and reveal more general issues regarding the neoclassical theory
of production. Paradoxically, ecological economists seem unable to escape from this
analytical representation of production and do not provide a clear alternative to this
model. By the end of his paper, Daly suggests that “Georgescu’s fund-flow model of the
production process is superior to the neoclassical production function” (1997a, 265),
and Georgescu-Roegen himself had mentioned it in his criticism of neoclassical resources
economics. But the relevance of the flow-fund model is never examined in more details,
nor used to formalise the issues at stake.
This is all the more important because the issues underlying this controversy have
perpetuated until nowadays through the opposition between “weak” and “strong” sus-
tainability. In fact, the debate of 1997 happens at a moment were this new way of
presenting the opposition has just crystallised and therefore is an important landmark
in the confrontation between these two approaches. It underlines in particular the im-
portance of theories and models of production for the analysis of sustainability, and the
challenges that this represents for economic thought.
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